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LORNA M. ALDER SOFFE, aka 
LORNA M. ALDER, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
- - - - - - - - - - -
-vs- Case No. 17342 
DONALD BLAINE RIDD and 
NANCY M. RIDD, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant (vendor) to retake a home 
and real property and to terminate a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the 
sale of said home and real property, and a Counterclaim by defendants-
respondents for the return of monies paid by defendants-respondents to 
plaintiff-appellant on said Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint was dismissed, no cause of action, 
and defendants-respondents were granted judgment on their Counterclaim in 
the sum of $15,897.19. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the judgment of the lower court, wherein defendants-
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respondents were granted judgment against plaintiff-appellant on their 
Counterclaim and remanded with directions to the lower court to dismiss 
defendants-respondents Counterclaim, and that plaintiff-appellant be 
awarded attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 10th day of March, 1978, defendants-respondento, 
pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract (plaintiff-appellant's Exhibit 
agreed to purchase, and plaintiff-appellant agreed to sell a home and 
approximately .70 acre of real property at 1341 East Creek Road, Sandy, 
Utah, as described by said Uniform Real Estate Contract. The total pur-
chase price of said home and real property was $57,500.00, payable $16,500.8:· 
down, $325.00 per month, and $10,250.00 on the 10th day of March of each 
year thereafter on the principal, with interest at 9-1/2% per annum. 
Defendants-respondents moved into the home and paid $325.00 per 
month through April, 1979. Defendants-respondents failed to pay the 
$10,250.00 payment due March 10, 1979, and failed to pay further monthly 
payments; and on the 18th day of April, 1979, plaintiff-appellant had 
served on defendants-respondents a Notice of Default (R. 8-10). On April 
1979, plaintiff-appellant had served upon defendants-respondents a notice 
terminating the contract (R. 10-11). This action was commenced to remove 
defendants-respondents from the home and to terminate the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, and defendants-respondents on or about the 22nd day of 
June, 1979, moved from the home. Plaintiff-appellant thereafter entered 
upon the premises and did certain repair work as hereinafter set forth 
(Exhibits 4-P, 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P). 
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The home on the property was fairly old, and pursuant to defendants-
respondents' counsel, Mra Harrison 1 s, testimony, the home was in some 
disrepair, had outbuildings, including chicken coops and garage, and an 
orchard, etc. (Tr. 180: 1-30). 
Plaintiff-appellant testified and presented exhibits as to her cost 
factors by way of the sale to defendants-respondents and as to repairs, 
maintenance, utility bills, and anticipated costs of resale, which were as 
follows: Title insurance policy $259.00 (Exhibit 2-P Tr. 136: 23-28); 
taxes $537.15 (Exhibit 3-P Tr. 137: 5-9); list of expenses including checks 
written for linoleum repairs $150.00; carpet labor and materials $1,020.47; 
painting $1,165.00; draperies $296.31; carpentry work $330.57; electrical 
materials $48.65; plumbing expense $65.00; miscellaneous $9.11; sewer unpaid 
by defendants-respondents $5.28; replacement of shrubs $204.36; payment to a 
cleaner $100.00; mileage $79.00; labor by plaintiff-appellant and her husband 
$4,953.75; insurance $73.00 (Exhibit 4-P). In addition, time records of 
plaintiff-appellant and defendants-respondents were admitted (Exhibit 7-P). 
In addition to the above, plaintiff-appellant testified that she 
had not sold the home (Tr. 147: 16-19), and in fact still has not been able 
to sell the home as of this date. Plaintiff-appellant testified that the 
sum of $400.00 to $450.00 would be a reasonable rental value, and based on 
$400.00 per month for twenty-five months, said time from the date of contract 
until the time of trial would total $10,000.00 (Tr. 175: 3-8); and defendants-
respondents' expert witness, Mark B. Stevens, a brother in law of defendant-
respondent Nancy M. Ridd, testified as an expert that $325.00 was a 
<••sonable rental value (Tr. 214: 12-14). The court allowed $325.00 per 
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month for fifteen months. Both plaintiff-appellant and defendant-responden'. 
Donald Blaine Ridd acknowledged that in their opinion the home was worth 
$50,000.00 in June, 1979, when defendants-respondents left the home, a loss 
of bargain of $7,500.00 (Tr. 199: 5-9). There was also testimony by plainti:-. 
appellant that a real estate commission to sel 1 the home would be 6'C or 
$3,450.00, and that a new title policy would cost $259.00. Plaintiff-
appellant's counsel testified as to his costs and attorney fees, includi~ 
the trial, totalling $3,982.30 (Tr. 176: 6-13). The total an,ount of 
plaintiff-appellant's loss, without including any interest factor or without 
knowing when the home would be sold, totalled $34,487.95, pursuant to 
plaintiff-appellant's testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
JUDGMENT IN THE SUM OF $15,897.19 ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
The court found that defendants-respondents had paid on the home 
the sum of $20,725.00 total, said sum being $16,500.00 downpayment and 
$325.00 per month for thirteen months, the $325.00 just covering the interest 
payment, and defendants-respondents were to pay the contract out in four 
years, with a minimum principal payment each year of $10,250.00. The court 
further found that there was a valid contract for the sale and purchase of' 
home and real property, and that the home, irrespective of the .70 acre, had 
a reasonable rental value of $325.00 per month, a total of $4,983.22, and 
that plaintiff-appellant's only loss was title insurance $259.00, sewer 
charge $5.28, cleaning $100.00, labor of plaintiff-appellant and her husband 
$375.00, insurance on the fence kept by defendants-respondents $100.00, and 
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fire insurance $73.00, for a total of $912.28, or a total of $5,895.50 
which the court deducted from the total payments made by defendants-
reopondents, and awarded judgment to defendants-respondents on their Counter-
claim of $14,829.50 plus 6% interest from the date defendants-respondents 
moved from the home on June 22, 1979, a total of $15,897.19. I am not sure 
why the court did not give the defaulting party a purple heart and a blue 
ribbon. 
The court did not consider certain items which by the contract 
itself were applicable, to-wit: The defendants-respondents, pursuant to 
paragraph 12, had agreed to pay taxes, and the court did not even award 
plaintiff-appellant any portion of the taxes she paid for the year 1979 in 
the sum of $537.15. The contract also provides the defaulting party pay 
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 21 of said Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, (and the court found the defendants-respondents defaulted 
on said contract), and testimony was given at trial by plaintiff-appellant's 
counsel as to $3,982.30 in attorney fees, and the court allowed~ attorney 
fees. In addition thereto, the court ignored the loss of bargain which both 
plaintiff-appellant and defendants-respondents had testified was $7,500.00, 
as well as ignored the fact that said home had to be resold, and that real 
estate conunissions would need to be paid, as well as new title insurance, 
and refused to consider the fact that the home had not sold and was still 
vacant on the 12th day of April, 1980, and by the way, said home has still 
not been sold. Also the court did not consider the repairs and expenditures 
in placing said home in condition for resale, including the time the plaintiff-
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appellant spent, and the court ignored the forfeiture provision of the 
contract, decided to remake the contract itself, and declared the terminatior. 
and forfeiture of the contract was unconscionable and created a totally 
unconscionable contract as to plaintiff-appellant. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 478-9, 243 P.2d 446, 451-2 
(1952), the Utah Supreme Court opened a can of worms, in that it has allowed 
trial courts to place their decision as to what is "unconscionable" and to 
ignore a contract as written, and to rewrite the contract as each trial court 
may determine as to what amount of money is a shock to its conscience. ISee 
alsc Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 ( 1954) and Peck v. Judd, 
7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712 (1958).) 
The trial courts and Utah Supreme Court have set forth in the above 
cases and others as well, as in Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 Utah (1977J. 
the following factors to be considered as to said forfeiture: 
"l. Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
"2. Any damage to er depreciation of the property; 
"3. Any decline in value due to change in market value of the 
property not allowed in items 1 and 2; 
"4. For the fair rental value during the period of occupancy." 
In the case of Johnson v. Carman, the court also found that interest 
on the balance due on said contract, as well as attorney fees, were also 
applicable damages to be considered, as well as other factors. 
The problem arises in regard to the court placing its decision as 
to what is or what is not unconscionable, in that as in this particular case 
before the court, the home was an older home with acreage, to-wit: 
• 
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approximately .70 acre, outbuildings and orchard, etc., that the property hcd 
not been resold, that the property was worth now $50,000.00, the downpayment 
and monthly payments have been spent by seller, she has not received any 
undue enrichment, does not have her advantage of receiving $325.00 per 
month and $10,250.00 per year. Yet defendants-respondents have a judgment 
against plaintiff-appellant at this point in excess of $16,000.00, which I 
suppose they can now execute upon, have the property sold at sheriff's sale, 
and in the event plaintiff-appellant cannot pay said judgment, defendants-
respondents would own the same property by reason of their execution on 
their judgment and would then have good title to the property without the 
payment of the balance due on the contract plus interest. 
Each day in the state of Utah there are buyers and sellers of 
homes and other properties by the use cf the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
This is especially true with the present high interest rates. In that regard 
by way of argument, if a purchase is made of one hundred acres at $10,000.00 
per acre, and of the $1,000,000.0C purchase price $200,000.00 is paid down 
and the balance is to be paid at $100,000.00 per year, with the idea and 
hope that the property can be sold in one year for $2,000,000.00, and said 
property having no buildings upon it and used only for grazing has a reason-
able rental value of $400.00 per year. A buyer can then come back to the 
court, and if we use the rationale of the trial court in this specific case, 
the seller's only damage is $400.00 for reasonable rental value, and when a 
default occurs and the contract is breached, one can request that the court 
return $199,600.00 of the downpayment. 
In no other arrangements for the sale of real property is this 
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true. In the event a trust deed is used on a home for $S ,000.00, and the 
home is worth $100,000.00, and the owner of the trust deed bids in the 
home at $S,OOO.OO, the court or no other governmental function protects the 
owner from the loss of $9S,OOO.OO, and the same is true of mortgages. 
In the case referred to above, Johnson v. Carman, Chief Justice 
Ellett in dissenting in that case, which dissent was joined by Justice 
Crockett, Chief Justice Ellett states as follows: 
"This case is not in equity to foreclose the interests of 
the purchaser. This is a law action for money had and 
received. To permit this sort of a case tc be considered 
is to encourage a purchaser to hold an interest in land 
and if the value thereof does not increase, to breach his 
agreement to pay, move out, and then sue for a return of 
his money. See the following cases which are in point: 
Glock v. Howard and Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, SS P. 
713 (1898); Skookumv. Thomas, 162 Cal. S39, 123 P. 363 
Cal. ( 1912); Jackson v. Peddycoart, 98 Okl, 198, 224 P. 
689 (1924). 
"The law does not permit one to take advantage of his own 
wrong or default. It is well settled by this court and 
other courts of the highest standing that the vendee in an 
executory contract for the purchase of lands, who, after 
paying part of the consideration under such contract, makes 
default and refuses to carry out the further terms agreed 
upon, cannot maintain an action to recover any of the considera-
tion advanced. Helm v. Rone, 43 Okl. 137, 141 P. 678; 
Snyder v. Johnson, 44 Okl. 388, 144 P. 1035; Hurley v. Anicker, 
51 Okl. 97, lSl P. S93. From the authorities cited it is 
clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the money 
paid, or to have affirmative relief as to the note and mort-
gage, unless the defendant's answer may be considered such a 
rescission on his part as would entitle the plaintiff to 
recover." 
In ~ummary of Utah Real Property Law, Volume 1, Chapter 9, BYU 
Legal Studies (1978), there is an extended discussion about the forfeituu 
provision, commencing on page 303-306. 
The basic problem of the court placing itself as the conscience 
• 
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bearer of a defaulting party who created the wrong, is that a contracting 
party can never be sure as to whether or not if he sells on a Uniform Real 
ist•t• Contract, that he may end up being required to return the money of a 
defaulting party, even though the seller no longer has the monry to return. 
That also leads to the question of what is unconscionable. In 
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963), the court determined 
that a buyer who had purchased a piece of property for $41,500.00, made 
payments of $19,000.00, and had spent $9,500.00 on repairs, was not 
unconscionable and allowed the forfeiture. 
In the case before the court, a sale for $57,500.00 wherein 
$20,725.00 had been paid, was determined to be unconscionable, and the 
court ignored the fact that plaintiff-appellant had expended considerable 
sums by way of repairs, and the court did not allow plaintiff-appellant 
normal damages as allowed by this court in numerous cases, including taxes, 
interest on unpaid balance, loss of bargain, title insurance, future cost 
of sale, attorney fees, etc., and awarded the defaulting party $15,897.19 
plus 8% interest from the total amount received of $20,725.00, after over 
fifteen months of occupying the property. The court would not have returned 
to seller any sums if the buyer had sold the property after fifteen months 
for $157,000.00, then why should the reverse be true? 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the District 
Court should be reversed, and the action remanded with instructions to 
dismiss defendants-respondents Counterclaim, and grant plaintiff attorney 
fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NOLAN J. OLSEN Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
